Opening Statement (As Prepared)
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the witnesses for being here. Admiral Franchetti and General Smith, I know this is your first time testifying before this committee in your current roles and I want to welcome you. I look forward to your testimony.
The Navy and Marine Corps are currently on the front lines of U.S. efforts to deter conflict. We have the most combat experienced Navy since World War II. But this capability does not come without a cost and we are on the wrong side of that equation. Without any real short-term directed energy solution, we have to rely on the systems we have today which are far more expensive than the weapons they are defeating. I am concerned about the impact to the Navy’s ability to conduct Integrated Air and Missile Defense with the decision to cancel production of SM-3 Block IB, which is a critical capability for the Aegis fleet that is not even meeting regional Combatant Commander requirements to date. It is unclear what the impact of the SM-3IB cancellation on the rest of the standard missile family who rely on the same supplier base.
I am also concerned about the current state of Navy shipbuilding. Mr. Secretary. I know you have the same concerns which led you to direct a 45-day review of shipbuilding. While I applaud the initiative, I do not believe this effort went far enough. The review accurately described the troubled state of most of our current shipbuilding programs, but it failed to identify real substantive changes that could lead to improved cost and performance. It also failed to take an inward assessment or acknowledge shortcomings of Navy leadership who were tasked with managing and overseeing many of these programs. The review also states that “industry has been slow to respond, and in many cases, reticent to invest." For industry to make the needed investments, they need a stable projection of work. Decisions such as reducing one Virginia class submarine from the budget after we have already spent over $1 billion on said submarine does not instill the needed confidence for the industrial base to make investments.
I am encouraged by comments from Navy leadership on the need to “get more players on the field." The quickest way to accomplish this goal is to improve and shorten maintenance periods. Our public and private shipyards are challenged to deliver ships and submarines back to the fleet on schedule and on budget. A prime example of the Navy’s maintenance woes is the USS Boxer, which was supposed to be the flagship of the current Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) deployed to the Pacific however it was plagued with a series of engineering casualties that were avoidable and was delayed in getting underway. After getting underway, it was forced to return to port due to another casualty and may potentially miss the entire deployment leaving the ARG without its flagship. I look forward to hearing from the witnesses on ways the Navy can avoid scenarios like this in the future.
I want to thank the witnesses again and hope you can address my concerns in your testimony.
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