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Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to welcome and thank both of our witnesses for appearing today. I also want to commend the Chair and Vice Chair of the commission on completing the difficult task they were charged with, particularly given today’s environment. While I do not agree with every assertion made by the final report, and I am certain there are aspects that each commissioner would have written very differently, the outcome demonstrates that our national security can, and should be, an area where we can find some common ground.
As the Strategic Posture Commission highlighted in its report, the United States faces a fundamentally different strategic setting than it has experienced during the past 70 years. Increases in numbers of nuclear weapons pose significant threats, and potential conflict in new domains such as space and cyber significantly complicates the risks of rapid or inadvertent escalation in a crisis or conflict. Given this framework, I think it is prudent to begin thinking about and planning for how the United States will continue to lower the risk of nuclear use and the risk of miscalculation that could lead to nuclear war. I agree with the commissioners that strategic deterrence is a whole-of-government effort, and the Department of Defense alone is ill-suited with the task of maintaining strategic stability, regardless of the size, composition, or posture of our nuclear deterrent. Strategic deterrence demands focus in new areas, and in a cost-effective manner, to reduce the risk of rapid escalation in a crisis or conventional war, well below the threshold of considering nuclear weapons use.
One area where I question the findings of the commissioners is the assertion that we must perpetuate and remain beholden to an outdated architecture, specifically with regards to the land-based ICBMs, that was deployed in the 1960s. Given advancements in technology, I am not convinced that the only way to maintain our current deterrence posture is with a system that was designed over 60 years ago. In this context and the estimated $100 billion price tag for the Sentinel program, I would like the commissioners to address why eliminating this obsolete leg of the triad or at least transitioning to a mobile, agile, and survivable architecture as the Commission report recommends, is not a better approach to deterrence.
While the report does not mandate increases and is nuanced about the potential need to modify the size or composition of our nuclear forces, one thing is clear – our existing programs of record across both the Department of Defense and National Nuclear Security Administration are woefully underperforming. In some cases, they are years behind and billions of dollars above their original estimates. This is unacceptable, and at some point, hard decisions will need to be made on how we can adapt to a new threat environment while clinging on to existing, failing programs.
I would like to also focus on the report’s conclusions on the need for the U.S. to 1) maintain strong alliances and partnerships, 2) implement better planning tools across military, diplomatic, and economic avenues in the event of conflict, 3) leverage innovation across the industrial base to increase resiliency of our current architecture, namely in space and nuclear command and control, 4) increase conventional deterrence, 5)act as a responsible, transparent nuclear power, despite the erosion of existing arms control agreements, and 6) continue exploring future arms control agreements with a goal of ultimately reducing the role of nuclear weapons and the risk of nuclear war.
Lastly, where I am most disappointed with this report is the fact that there is no mention of what any of these recommendations will cost. With oversight of the entire defense budget, providing this committee a list of recommendations without any discussion of prioritization or budget implications is irresponsible. To that end, I hope our discussion today can help us understand specific areas we should be focusing on in the short-term, particularly with regards to conventional capabilities.
I look forward to the witnesses’ testimony, and hope today’s hearing can help give a bit more clarity on where we go from here, with the ultimate goal of lowering the risk of nuclear war today, and into the future.
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