Opening Statement (As Prepared)

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Thank you, Chairman Lamborn. And welcome to our panel of distinguished witnesses.

Since holding this hearing one year ago, the global strategic landscape has continued to deteriorate. The CCP is expanding their nuclear arsenal at a rate that has exceeded U.S. intelligence estimates, while also developing and testing novel and de-stabilizing delivery systems – including hypersonic weapons more developed than our own – all of which could carry a nuclear warhead.  War criminal Vladimir Putin continues to use thinly-veiled nuclear threats in his criminal war against Ukraine, and he recently deployed dual-capable weapons on the border of Finland - one of the newest members of NATO.

We are dealing with two near-peer nuclear-armed competitors. We never have before. The jurisdiction of this subcommittee, while so esoteric that it’s even further below the radar than our adversaries’ hypersonics, remains one of the most consequential of any in Congress. (The puns are esoteric as well, gentlemen.)

I believe my kids would be safer if we eliminated nuclear weapons. The sheer number of close calls with accidental launches the world has had in the mere 80 years—just one human lifetime—should concern anyone who understands basic statistics. I hope we never lose sight of what should be a shared goal of all nations, but until we get there, we know only two fundamental ways to prevent nuclear weapons from ever being used: The first is reducing the number we all have through arms control, and the second is instilling confidence in our adversaries that the weapons we have are safe, secure, reliable, and can be employed to devastating effect.

There is broad bipartisan support for the nuclear triad. This means making the significant investments across the Department of Defense and National Nuclear Security Administration, the NNSA, to produce new platforms such as the B-21 and Columbia-class SSBNs; modernized delivery systems, such as the Sentinel ICBM, Long-Range Stand-off weapon and the next Trident D5 life extension variant; and updating aging NNSA infrastructure across the National Labs and production facilities. This Administration understands this, and has included $49.2 billion in the budget request to recapitalize all legs of the triad and improve nuclear command, control, and communications.

While we are making those significant investments across every aspect of the nuclear enterprise, the reality is that both DoD and NNSA continue to struggle to develop and deliver new systems on time and on budget. We stopped making this stuff for a while; most facilities that do still exist pre-date personal computers.

Now the Elephant’s Foot in the room: the Air Force recently notified Congress that the Sentinel program has reached a critical breach for both cost and schedule – an alarming “at least” over 37% over budget and at minimum 2 years delayed. This means that if the program continues on the current path, it will be at least $30 billion over the initial estimate. This is completely unacceptable. The good American taxpayers that we represent deserve to know how the Pentagon and Northrup Grumman are wasting their money and imperiling our national security. Dr. LaPlante – I look forward to continuing an open dialogue with you and the Air Force as you work through the Nunn-McCurdy process to ensure we never end up in this spot again, and deliver a critical capability in time to replace the aging Minuteman III ICBMs in the field today.

Finally, I continue to worry that we, as a nation, have lost a critical “capability” when it comes to strategic deterrence. And this is not weapons or warheads but, rather, the thought leadership around the basic theories of nuclear deterrence. During the Cold War, hundreds of scholars at universities and think tanks across America focused on understanding how, and when, countries would make the decision to employ such a devastating weapon. Today, while I know the Department of Defense conducts many wargames, I fear that there is only a very small number of experts truly thinking about how modern strategic deterrence works –particularly when facing two nuclear-armed near-peer adversaries. I must say I am encouraged by General Cotton’s leadership on this issue, but much more of the country needs to contribute as well.

I hope today’s witnesses can help this subcommittee better understand what is being done on both policy and acquisition to ensure that U.S. nuclear forces continue to keep us safe and secure.

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