I wish to welcome the witnesses and thank them for appearing today to discuss the recently published findings and recommendations of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy. I would also like to thank the other commissioners and the commission’s staff members for their service.
Together, the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy (NDS) provide the framework to “outcompete our strategic competitors” and “to sustain and strengthen U.S. deterrence, with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the Department’s pacing challenge.” The NDS also stipulates that the United States will work closely with allies and partners to “reinforce robust deterrence in the face of Russian aggression while mitigating and protecting against threats from North Korea, Iran, violent extremist organizations, and transboundary challenges such as climate change.” Consequently, the NDS embraces the concept of “integrated deterrence” to “develop, combine, and coordinate” the Department of Defense’s various capabilities in support of the United States’ commitment to upholding an inclusive, rules-based, international order as the basis of global stability and prosperity.
The commission examined the NDS and its implementation within the context of what it characterizes as “the most challenging global environment with the most severe ramifications since the end of the Cold War.” In the commission’s estimation, the United States is not prepared to fight a global conflict. The commission warns of the dangers of adversarial opportunism and malign collaboration and of their potentially compounding effects. It questions the United States’ ability to deter simultaneous threats and, if necessary, to prevail in one or more major, multi-theater, multi-domain conflicts. The commission found that the Department of Defense is currently undersized, under-resourced, and undermined by outmoded structures, systems, and processes. However, it also found that: “DoD cannot, and should not, provide for the national defense by itself.” Instead, it determined that: “A truly ‘all-elements of national power’ approach is required to coordinate and leverage resources across DoD, the rest of the executive branch, the private sector, civil society, and U.S. allies and partners.”
I appreciate the commission’s more expansive approach, as the United States’ domestic capacity, concerted U.S. governmental efforts, and the contributions of allies and partners are all crucial to U.S. national security. I am pleased that the commission concentrated on promoting civic engagement, spurring innovation, and revitalizing the defense industrial base in addition to modernizing the force, reinforcing readiness, and facilitating organizational adaptation. I am also pleased that the commission advocates for sufficient resources and fiscal continuity for both the defense and nondefense aspects of the national security establishment. This is an especially poignant recommendation, as we approach the end of another fiscal year without the Congress having passed appropriations for the succeeding one.
The commission recommends the allocation of persistently elevated spending levels “commensurate with the U.S. national effort seen during the Cold War.” The report declares: “A bipartisan ‘call to arms’ is urgently needed so that the United States can make the major changes and significant investments now rather than wait for the next Pearl Harbor or 9/11.” In doing so, it asserts: “The support and resolve of the American public are indispensable.” The commission’s report further specifies: “The ‘all elements’ effort requires the support of the public for mobilization of the economy; broader volunteering in military, public, and civic service; and the willingness to sacrifice through taxation and possible changes to entitlement benefits so the nation can afford the cost of global leadership.”
The commission’s recognition that this “call to arms” would require well-informed public support is fitting, because it begs several important questions that the American people would ultimately have to answer. Chief among them would be: to which compelling purposes or ends, apart from deterring armed conflict in all its undesirable forms, would this call be directed and would each of those identified purposes or ends be consistent with our national values? During the Cold War, President Eisenhower said, “Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.”
We should reflect on this message, as we consider the commission’s findings and recommendations. Without diminishing the seriousness of any of the national security challenges that we face, we must remain clear-eyed and level-headed. Our commitment to national security must be fortified by a sound, multi-tool, deterrence strategy, which provides every option for the effective avoidance of conflict, and validated by our collective will to live freely and prosper peaceably.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to receiving the witnesses’ testimony.
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