Opening Statement (As Prepared)
Click here to stream the hearing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thank you, Chairman Lamborn, and welcome to our panel of witnesses. Before I begin my remarks, it is my understanding, Dr. Plumb, that this will be your last hearing as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. I want to personally thank you for being a trailblazer. You’ve accomplished a lot, and while we have much more to do to continue to stay ahead, today I am confident in our course, and I was not confident in our course five years ago. It’s been a remarkable turnaround, and you have been a big part of that.
Our National Security Space architecture is undergoing a significant transformation, a transformation necessary because everyday American life is deeply reliant on space. The Global Positioning System – GPS – probably helped everyone in this room get somewhere today, and it also provides necessary timing information to nearly every banking and financial system worldwide. And it is no secret that most weapon systems in the Department of Defense inventory require a GPS signal as well. In part because of this overreliance, our adversaries have been developing, deploying, and demonstrating capabilities in space and on earth to deny, degrade, and destroy U.S. satellites. In just the past two years, the People’s Republic of China has almost doubled their number of satellites on orbit to 400, with plans for nearly 1,000 by 2030—and they include capabilities with inherently offensive applications. And, as we all now know, due to what was essentially an intelligence leak from Congress, Russia is developing a nuclear weapon in space. If launched, it would be in direct violation of the Outer Space Treaty and, if detonated, it would degrade or destroy nearly every satellite in its path.
These advancements by our adversaries have required a transformation to a more proliferated, resilient, and protected U.S. architecture. In addition, the U.S. commercial market has exploded in the past 5 years. SpaceX is probably best known, but there are companies outpacing DoD in innovation across the board, whether than be in satellite communications, remote sensing, space domain awareness, or in developing capabilities to defend and protect our existing, exquisite satellites on-orbit today. While this subcommittee has been pushing both the DoD and Intelligence Community to fully embrace commercial capabilities, that culture shift has been met with considerable resistance. That is why I am very encouraged by the release of both the DoD and Space Force commercial space strategies. It is not enough to simply award contracts; we must have a plan to fully integrate these innovative commercial capabilities into Government systems to help reinforce our national advantage in space.
We also continue to make significant progress in with our incredible network of allies and partners. The U.S. must continue to lead by example on establishing norms of behavior for responsible operations in space.
Not to diminish this progress overall, there are some areas we should continue to watch closely. In addition to the pattern of large satellite programs being late and over budget, the ground system architecture still frequently comes as an afterthought. We have been notified yet again of delays to the Next-Generation Operational Ground Control Segment, the modern, cybersecure ground system to operate the GPS satellites. OCX was supposed to be delivered in 2016 for $3.9 billion. Now 8 years later, and at almost double that cost, we are still waiting. Unfortunately, OCX is the most egregious case, but others such as Atlas are also experiencing delays and cost overruns. Mr. Calvelli, I would like to understand how you are addressing these issues holistically across the Space Force.
Another area this subcommittee must watch is the jurisdictional divide between traditional space-based intelligence collection, versus DoD’s use of the domain for tactical applications. The latter is a somewhat new phenomenon -- tactical missions like surveillance of ground targets are now moving from land, sea, or air platforms onto orbit. We must be sure that government policy does not assume that all space assets are formal intelligence, or Title 50, assets – or we may accidentally block our Combatant Commanders from getting targeting information quickly enough to use it, or block the Services from fully taking advantage of commercial imagery and sensing.
Space is a fascinating and infinite domain. Until recently, we only really experienced it through the lens of science fiction. But in reality, space has been a part of our daily lives as Americans since the dawn of the space race, and our adversaries are keenly aware of that. Our warfighters everywhere, on the ground, under the sea, and in the air, depend on space. The global dependance on space often means relying on American satellites. We must keep them secure—not only against the threats we see today, but against what we will face in the years and decades to come. I look forward to today’s discussion with our witnesses on how best to maintain U.S. superiority in space.
###