Thank you, Chairman Lamborn. I would also like to welcome our panel of distinguished witnesses, here on December 7th, the 82nd anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

In Ukraine, Israel, and around the world, our adversaries are using missiles to attack, not just military targets, but diplomatic facilities, energy infrastructure, commercial shipping vessels, and civilian populations. Fortunately, their success has been limited, in part, due to deployed missile defenses, many of which are developed and produced by the United States.

During one of this subcommittee’s previous hearings, I laid out the four levels at which missile defenses might be used: Level 1 – Strategic Defense against peer adversaries; Level 2 – addresses a capability to address rogue nation threats; Level 3 – while somewhat of a nuance, is the ability to defeat an accidental launch of a near-peer adversary; Level 4 - is regional/tactical level missile defense; and, Level 5 – is the foundational level of being able to detect and track threats from the moment they are launched, throughout their flight, and up until they reach their impact point.

Today we are focused on that “fourth level” – regional or tactical missile defense. In the last two years, we have seen how important this is. Ukraine has received incredible support from allies and partners on air and missile defense, which has enabled them to fight back against near non-stop Russian missile attacks. It’s safe to say that, not only have these systems saved countless civilian lives, but they are a key reason Ukraine has been able to maintain its sovereignty almost two years after war criminal Vladimir Putin’s criminal invasion.

In Israel, we continue to witness the critical, daily role that tactical missile defenses play in defending Israeli citizens from rocket, artillery, mortar, attack drone, and ballistic missile threats being launched into the country. For years, these defensive systems, like the famed Iron Dome, have also saved Palestinian lives because, previously, the only protection Israel found against these attacks was hitting back offensively. Imagine if the bombing like we’ve seen over the past two months happened every time rockets were fired at Israel over the past two decades.

The Administration has also shifted U.S. force structure in the region, deploying the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, battery to Saudi Arabia, adding Patriot battalions, and increasing Aegis BMD at-sea presence. These systems have not only defended against attacks on U.S. deployed forces, but also against attacks aimed at commercial shipping vessels in one of the most congested and vital thoroughfares of global trade.

While these systems are performing well operationally, this confluence of global aggression has spotlighted our limited capacity to address the growing requirements from each of the Combatant Commanders, primarily in the INDOPACOM, CENTCOM, and EUCOM theaters of operation. With a finite number of Aegis BMD-capable ships, THAAD batteries and Patriot battalions, at some point – a point we may have already reached – any changes in our regional missile defense posture will almost certainly induce risk somewhere else in the world.

The limited capacity of regional missile defense capabilities highlights a central issue in the missile defense policy debate. Missile defense, to date, has been on the wrong side of the cost equation, and at the end of the day, it is a simple numbers game. For example, the USS Carney has recently shot down several Houthi missiles using Standard Missile-2 interceptors. Those interceptors have a per-unit cost of $2 million, more than double the cost of the cruise missiles they shot down. This is why we must look at next generation capabilities that can flip the cost paradigm, such as directed energy, cyber, and other innovative solutions that are not one-for-one point defenses. Only then will we have a decent change of stopping our adversaries from relying on missile technology.

Lastly, while we are here today primarily to talk about systems and capabilities, we would be remiss not to discuss our greatest asset when it comes to missile defense – the soldiers and sailors assigned to the Aegis BMD ships, Patriot battalions and THAAD batteries around the world. I remember in the early days of Iraq and Afghanistan when the missile defense community had little to do. But recently, these troops have been overtaxed, experiencing shorter and shorter deployment to dwell times. GAO has repeatedly reported on the negative impact on readiness and training for the community. The Navy, though less discussed, is not in immune to these issues either. The independent review conducted after the collisions of the USS McCain and Fitzgerald, both Aegis BMD capable ships, highlighted the increased op-tempo on the crews due to long at-sea deployments and increasing mission requirements, and how those contributed to basic training often being skipped. While this subcommittee tends to focus on the high demand of the weapon systems, we cannot forget about the impact of this intense global demand for missile defense places on the men and women who are at the core of our capability.

Missiles are an integral part of the modern way of war, and thus so too is missile defense. I look forward to discussing with the witnesses where we can improve these systems and innovate towards the future capabilities we need to meet the increasingly complex missile threats proliferating around the world.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.