Opening Statement (As Prepared)
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I thank all the witnesses for their time and look forward to our discussion today.
In reviewing the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy tactical aircraft requests this year, the justification is as great as ever for this subcommittee’s continued detailed oversight of these large, complex, and expensive programs.
This hearing is one of the most important we do every year; and, understandably, we often focus most on issues related to cost, performance, schedule, and management of these programs.
However, with this budget request, we need also to get answers from our witnesses about how they are assessing and managing strategic risk associated with our tactical aviation force structure. For example:
• The Air Force will procure 60 aircraft in FY25, which represents a reduction of 12 aircraft from what last year’s budget request projected. Additionally, the Air Force plans to retire 190 aircraft, a net loss of 130 tactical fighter aircraft.
• If you compare FY25 through FY29, the Air Force plans to procure 244 tactical fighter aircraft, and retire 594, for a net loss of 350 aircraft.
I have generally supported plans to retire current systems that no longer meet capability requirements, or that are not relevant to the modern battlefield. We must ensure, however, that we are not taking too much near-term risk by retiring too much capacity too soon. Our Air Force witnesses should help us understand the risk they see in their plan and why that risk is acceptable.
For the Navy, I was pleased to see that you have contracted for the final F/A-18 Super Hornets. It also appears that your Service Life Modernization program will rapidly increase the quantity of Block 3 Super Hornets across the fleet. Recent analysis shows that you will now close the Strike-Fighter shortfall in FY25.
I’d like our Navy witnesses today to explain how F-35C procurement and fielding plays into your Strike-Fighter shortfall analysis, and then whether the Navy’s continued slow ramp for F-35C procurement could eventually create another strike fighter shortfall.
I am happy to see the Marine Corps continue to aggressively procure and field F-35 aircraft, as they retire their AV-8B Harriers and F/A-18C Hornets.
More importantly the Marine Corps has reversed course on last year’s plan to reduce the number of F-35 aircraft per squadron and will now field 12-aircraft per squadron. I think this plan supports the Marine Corps generation of higher sortie rates needed in a crisis. Moreover, it’s encouraging that the Marine Corps can and will reverse course when the underpinning analysis changes.
Turning to the F-35 program – although this program has many accomplishments, it also suffers from chronic delays and cost overruns. In particular:
• Engine life reductions due to excessive bleed air demand;
• Technical Refresh 3 hardware immaturity;
• Block 4 software instability; and,
• Full Mission Capable rates that fall well below what the services require.
There’s no doubt this program is too slow to deliver to the force. I’d like Lieutenant General Schmidt to explain how he will manage the development and integration risk for these various efforts but also what actions he’s taking to better deliver capability to the services.
Sticking with F-35, to the extent possible in an unclassified setting, I’d like Dr. Schmidt from DOT&E to explain his conclusions and recommendations regarding the recent F-35 Initial Operational Test and Evaluation; and, I’d also like Lieutenant General Schmidt to explain how he’s getting after these recommendations.
We have a lot to discuss today. I thank the witnesses for their appearance today and look forward to their testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
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