Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the witnesses for their time today. I look forward to our discussion.
Mr. Chairman, I’d especially like to thank you for conducting this hearing in an unclassified setting. This topic has made the national news lately, and I think it’s important that the public has the opportunity to see and hear how Department of Defense officials are addressing the threats, both domestically and abroad. We’ve assembled a great set of witnesses today to discuss Unmanned Aircraft Systems, or “U-A-S”, commonly known as drones, and Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems, or “C-U-A-S”.
Developments over the last few years, both at home and abroad, demonstrate we are way behind in the development, testing, and fielding of effective unmanned aircraft systems and counter-unmanned aircraft systems across the joint force. In the last 2 years alone, tragedy struck with the loss of U.S. soldiers’ lives in the Tower 22 U-A-S. Further incidents cause disruptions for our military and civilian populations with incidents domestically in Langley, Virginia, and Picatinny, New Jersey. The clear conclusion I draw from these examples is that our adversaries are exploiting a capability gap; a gap that we must close immediately.
The problems, however, are deeper than a lack of capability or capacity. Many of the problems lie within our process of developing and acquiring capabilities. What we are seeing in Ukraine is a need and ability to rapidly field capability in sufficient quantity and then modify or upgrade those capabilities on an almost weekly basis to respond to emerging threats. This applies to both U-A-S and C-U-A-S systems. As a rhetorical question, I ask whether we think the Pentagon acquisition system is optimized to develop, procure, field, and modify in the timelines discussed above. I suspect that everyone here agrees with me the answer is likely “no”. We must think differently about how to procure these capabilities for our warfighters. We can and must do better. We have Mr. Beck with us here today from the Defense Innovation Unit. I look forward to hearing from him about how DIU is working with leading and emerging technology companies to effectively mitigate this problem. And while I recognize this hearing is not centered on acquisition reform, I think there is opportunity here to discuss what we can do differently in the U-A-S and C-U-A-S space. So, I look forward to his testimony today.
Focusing on the counter-UAS problem, the services must field capability that persist and operate in three environments: homeland defense, base defense abroad, and on a highly contested battlefield. Each of these environments present a unique set of challenges, whether it’s the various authorities to operate systems in the Continental United States, host-nation approvals, or kinetic threats. Yet, our services must develop and field capabilities that have commonality across these environments, especially for sensing, identifying, and tracking threats. It would be helpful if the witnesses today explained how and whether the systems they are fielding can operate in all environments, and what challenges they see as they train the force. Furthermore, how do we scale our counter U-A-S capabilities to match potential changes in scale of the U-A-S threat, while juggling the varying authorities and technical challenges of the three types of environments? I also look forward to hear how each of the witnesses works with the Joint Counter Small U-A-S Office, and how the Joint Counter Small U-A-S Office is working with the services, to find joint solutions.
Lastly, U-A-S. As it pertains to small U-A-S, I think the days of a service having large programs of record are over. The modern battlefield requires small U-A-S solutions that are produced, modernized or upgraded, and repaired at the leading edge of the battlefield, on a weekly basis – similar to what we are seeing in Ukraine. This might require the services to procure in tranches, perhaps with a different vendor for each tranche. Eliminating vendor lock is crucial for ensuring the warfighters have the latest technology. I believe the Army and the Marine Corps are both moving forward with such an acquisition strategy and I look forward to hearing from Lieutenant Generals Collins and Austin as to how they will meet warfighter requirements today and in the future.
I thank the witnesses for their appearance today and look forward to their testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Chairman, I’d especially like to thank you for conducting this hearing in an unclassified setting. This topic has made the national news lately, and I think it’s important that the public has the opportunity to see and hear how Department of Defense officials are addressing the threats, both domestically and abroad. We’ve assembled a great set of witnesses today to discuss Unmanned Aircraft Systems, or “U-A-S”, commonly known as drones, and Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems, or “C-U-A-S”.
Developments over the last few years, both at home and abroad, demonstrate we are way behind in the development, testing, and fielding of effective unmanned aircraft systems and counter-unmanned aircraft systems across the joint force. In the last 2 years alone, tragedy struck with the loss of U.S. soldiers’ lives in the Tower 22 U-A-S. Further incidents cause disruptions for our military and civilian populations with incidents domestically in Langley, Virginia, and Picatinny, New Jersey. The clear conclusion I draw from these examples is that our adversaries are exploiting a capability gap; a gap that we must close immediately.
The problems, however, are deeper than a lack of capability or capacity. Many of the problems lie within our process of developing and acquiring capabilities. What we are seeing in Ukraine is a need and ability to rapidly field capability in sufficient quantity and then modify or upgrade those capabilities on an almost weekly basis to respond to emerging threats. This applies to both U-A-S and C-U-A-S systems. As a rhetorical question, I ask whether we think the Pentagon acquisition system is optimized to develop, procure, field, and modify in the timelines discussed above. I suspect that everyone here agrees with me the answer is likely “no”. We must think differently about how to procure these capabilities for our warfighters. We can and must do better. We have Mr. Beck with us here today from the Defense Innovation Unit. I look forward to hearing from him about how DIU is working with leading and emerging technology companies to effectively mitigate this problem. And while I recognize this hearing is not centered on acquisition reform, I think there is opportunity here to discuss what we can do differently in the U-A-S and C-U-A-S space. So, I look forward to his testimony today.
Focusing on the counter-UAS problem, the services must field capability that persist and operate in three environments: homeland defense, base defense abroad, and on a highly contested battlefield. Each of these environments present a unique set of challenges, whether it’s the various authorities to operate systems in the Continental United States, host-nation approvals, or kinetic threats. Yet, our services must develop and field capabilities that have commonality across these environments, especially for sensing, identifying, and tracking threats. It would be helpful if the witnesses today explained how and whether the systems they are fielding can operate in all environments, and what challenges they see as they train the force. Furthermore, how do we scale our counter U-A-S capabilities to match potential changes in scale of the U-A-S threat, while juggling the varying authorities and technical challenges of the three types of environments? I also look forward to hear how each of the witnesses works with the Joint Counter Small U-A-S Office, and how the Joint Counter Small U-A-S Office is working with the services, to find joint solutions.
Lastly, U-A-S. As it pertains to small U-A-S, I think the days of a service having large programs of record are over. The modern battlefield requires small U-A-S solutions that are produced, modernized or upgraded, and repaired at the leading edge of the battlefield, on a weekly basis – similar to what we are seeing in Ukraine. This might require the services to procure in tranches, perhaps with a different vendor for each tranche. Eliminating vendor lock is crucial for ensuring the warfighters have the latest technology. I believe the Army and the Marine Corps are both moving forward with such an acquisition strategy and I look forward to hearing from Lieutenant Generals Collins and Austin as to how they will meet warfighter requirements today and in the future.
I thank the witnesses for their appearance today and look forward to their testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.