WASHINGTON, DC – Today the House Armed Services Committee’s Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform held its first organization meeting. Below, please find the organizational plan adopted by the Panel. The plan can also be found on the committee’s website, www.house.gov/hasc .
Panel Chairman Rob Andrews (D-NJ):
“As our work plan demonstrates, the defense
acquisition system is extremely complex, and the issues
surrounding it are numerous. The logical place to start is
the question of whether there is a means of measuring the
current system’s ability to effectively deliver goods
and services to the warfighter while making an efficient use
of taxpayer money. This panel has a significant task before
it, and I look forward to working with my colleagues as we
tackle this challenge.”
Panel Ranking Member Mike Conaway (R-TX):
“We look forward to having an opportunity to
thoroughly examine the root causes of the deficiencies we
continue to see in the acquisition process. I
appreciate the commitment that Chairman Skelton and Ranking
Member McHugh have made to our efforts to ensure we
don’t reach hasty conclusions, but rather, we address
this issue in a deliberative manner.”
House Committee on Armed Services
Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform
Organizational Plan
Panel Members
Rob Andrews, NJ,
Chairman
Mike Conaway, TX, Ranking Member
Jim Cooper,
TN
Duncan Hunter, CA
Brad Ellsworth,
IN
Mike Coffman, CO
Joe Sestak, PA
Rules and Procedures
The panel is constituted under Rule 5(a) of the rules of the
Committee on Armed Services to serve for a period of six
months beginning on the date of its organization, March 18,
2009. The Chairman of the Committee has the discretion
to reappoint the panel for a period up to an additional six
months.
The panel will follow the rules and procedures of the House Armed Services Committee, as adopted by the Committee for the 111th Congress, in all of its meetings, hearings, and other activities.
The panel has been tasked to examine the defense acquisition system and possible ways to improve the system’s outcomes. Although it does not have legislative jurisdiction, the panel will report its findings including any recommendations for possible legislation to the Committee.
Staffing
The panel will be assisted by staff of the House Armed
Services Committee designated by the Chairman and Ranking
Member of the Committee for this purpose.
Work Plan
The panel will examine the defense acquisition system to
evaluate its effectiveness in meeting two critical, and
sometimes conflicting, goals: 1) providing the best
available services, supplies, equipment and technology to the
warfighter when they are needed, and 2) providing best value
to the taxpayer for every dollar expended.
In examining the defense acquisition system, the panel
will focus on 5 primary issues:
1. Is there a method to reasonably measure the ability
of the defense acquisition system to meet these two critical
goals?
2. Is the current defense acquisition system effectively
meeting these goals, and if not, what are the root causes of
the system’s failure?
a. How do the requirements process and the budget
process influence acquisition outcomes?
b. Are the right people at the right level making
decisions and provided with the authority to carry them out
(e.g., are end users appropriately involved)?
c. Does the system generate or have access to the right
knowledge and information to enable good, transparent
decisions (e.g. are the confidence levels associated with
cost estimates appropriate and clearly explained)?
d. Does the defense acquisition system schedule major
decision points and bring issues for review at the right
times – when the appropriate information is available
to inform decision making?
e. Do the people who implement the system (i.e. the
acquisition workforce) exist in the correct numbers and have
the right training to execute decisions and run programs
efficiently and what is the appropriate role of contractors
in the management of the acquisition process?
f. How successful is the system in responding to the
urgency of warfighter needs and differing levels of
programmatic risk (e.g., can the system be tailored to
match the duration of capability development to the threat
cycle and/or be responsive to the rate of change in
technology)?
3. What administrative or cultural pressures,
challenges, or negative incentives lead to inefficiencies in
the system producing bad outcomes (e.g., management areas,
such as DoD Financial Management, flagged as high-risk by
GAO)?
4. What proposals have been made to reform the defense
acquisition system in studies performed by others?
5. What changes are necessary to ensure that the defense
acquisition system is best designed and operated to satisfy
the panel’s two goals?
In addition to these matters, the panel may examine other issues related to the defense acquisition system at the request of the Committee’s chairman with the concurrence of the Committee’s ranking member.
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