Opening Statement (As Prepared)
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I’d like to welcome each of our witnesses and to thank them for appearing today.
Stability in the Indo-Pacific region is critically important to U.S. national security interests. When addressing regional challenges, our efforts should be consistently aimed at easing tensions, preserving peace, and upholding internationally accepted norms in close coordination with allies and partners, because a secure and thriving Indo-Pacific is fundamental to regional and global prosperity.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continues to present a considerable challenge. Its willingness to act aggressively in contravention of international standards, coupled with its extensive efforts to modernize and to consolidate its control over the People’s Liberation Army, is cause for concern, and coercive actions orchestrated by the CCP undermine regional stability.
In meeting this challenge, we must be discerning, stay resolute, and build upon the United States’ strong policy foundation for deterring aggression and for competing on the strategic level with the CCP. I agree with the premise in the 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS), which asserts that the United States will “deter China in the Indo-Pacific through strength, not confrontation.” The Department should continue to support broader whole-of-government efforts to engage with the PRC in ways that are favorable to our national interests and true to our values, and, when conducting those efforts, the United States should remain committed to upholding the same norms and standards that are expected of China. In this context, the rules-based international order is not a “cloud-castle abstraction” as Secretary Hegseth would have us believe. I maintain that the United States and China can coexist and prosper peaceably. Furthermore, the United States should consistently engage with China in constructive dialogue, especially when it may lessen the risk of escalation by miscalculation.
The United States must also remain steadfast regarding Taiwan by continuing to support Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities in a manner consistent with the United States’ longstanding one-China policy and the Taiwan Relations Act. With respect to the cross-strait situation specifically, and to competing with the CCP generally, the United States should continue to implement a sound, multi-tool, deterrence strategy that affords every option for effectiveness.
The United States cannot discount the potential for conflict on the Korean Peninsula, and North Korea continues to threaten the broader international community. The United States must continue to apply a coherent, whole-of-government approach to containing this threat and to cooperate with allies and partners to deter North Korean aggression. The NDS states that “South Korea is capable of taking primary responsibility for deterring North Korea with critical but more limited U.S. support.” I'd like a clearer perspective today as to how this statement will affect U.S. force posture on the Korean peninsula and what it means for the U.S.-ROK alliance.
The United States must also continue to monitor Russian activities in the Indo-Pacific region. Vladimir Putin’s contempt for international norms is notorious, and Russia’s revived focus on the region warrants attention. Collaboration between Russia and North Korea is also troubling. North Korean troop deployments and arms transfers from North Korea to Russia have exacerbated the harms inflicted by Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine, and significant Russian enablement of North Korea’s military capacity could prove destabilizing to the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. These and other shared security challenges require careful consideration.
Strong relationships with allies and partners are crucial to addressing all these security challenges. The Indo-Pacific includes five treaty allies and a diverse network of countries with whom the United States cooperates in productive and mutually beneficial partnerships. As usual, various allies and partners, including Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and India, are contributing significantly to regional stability, and the United States has worked with each of them to develop capabilities and to reinforce posture and presence in the region. I am very concerned, however, by this administration’s treatment of allies and partners. Although, the NDS calls on them to assume various regional responsibilities, it appears to condition that support by prioritizing cooperation with “model allies” or “those who are spending as they need to and visibly doing more against threats in their regions.” It diminishes allies and partners that it characterizes as “dependencies” and those that “have been content to let us subsidize their defense.” I worry that this transactional approach may undermine the trust and confidence that are required of our security relationships in the Indo-Pacific region, rather than advance them.
I am also concerned that uncertainty caused by President Trump’s open-ended war of choice in the Middle East is stressing the economies of allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific and detracting from the priorities of deterring China and North Korea. In addition to better understanding the overall effect the Iran war is having on the Indo-Pacific security environment, I want to learn more about the specific impacts it may be having on U.S. force posture and readiness in the region. I also want to identify any tradeoffs or opportunity costs that the war may present or impose on our objectives in the Indo-Pacific region. Resources are finite, and I have often emphasized that simply spending more is not the answer. We need to spend wisely.
For several years running, U.S. commitments in the Indo-Pacific region have been bolstered by the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) and departmental initiatives, which prioritize modernizing and strengthening the United States’ regional presence, improving infrastructure and readiness, and building the defense and security capabilities of allies and partners. I look forward to reviewing the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2027, as it pertains to PDI and other important programs, projects, and activities, and I welcome the opportunity to work with the Department to ensure that necessary resources are directed toward optimizing those efforts in the Indo-Pacific region.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to receiving the witnesses’ testimony.